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THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON OPPORTUNITY IN
ATHLETICS SQUANDERED ITS OPPORTUNITY TO
UNDERSTAND COMMERCIAL COLLEGIATE SPORTS:
WHY THEY ELIMINATE MINOR MEN'S SPORTS AND
PREVENT TITLE IX FROM ACHIEVING FULL GENDER
EQUALITY
SUZANNE SANGREE*

The Department of Education recently announced that it would
not revise the regulations that apply Title IX 1 to athletics, thus rejecting
the recommendations of its Commission on Opportunity in Athletics
(Commission). 2 The Commission's recommendations would have
drastically undercut Title's IX's efficacy and would have established a
Bush Administration model for severely undermining civil rights
protections. Fortunately, the Administration heeded the public critique of
the Commission's recommendations and retreated from its previously
stated intention to implement them.3 Instead, the Administration
reiterated its support for the principles of gender equality embodied in
Title IX and thus narrowly averted a civil rights disaster.
The great shame, however, is that a year of expert studies and
public hearings concerning Title IX's application to athletics yielded so
little insight. The Commission squandered a rare opportunity to
understand and address how Title IX's efficacy is limited and how its
impact is distorted by the multi-million dollar commercial enterprises of
men's football and basketball, which dominate collegiate athletics.4
* Visiting Professor, West Virginia University (WVU) College of Law. The author
thanks WVU College of Law for its generous writing support through the Hodges Foundation.
The author also thanks Tamara Williamson for her research assistance and Douglas L. Colbert for
his critical comments and sports savvy.
1. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2000).
2. Frank Litsky, Bush Administration Decides Title IX Should Stay as It Is, N.Y. TIMES,
July 12, 2003, at B 15; OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., FURTHER CLARIFICATION
OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS POLICY REGARDING TITLE IX COMPLIANCE (July 11, 2003)
[hereinafter FURTHER CLARIFICATION] (transmitted by letter from Gerald Reynolds, Assistant

Sec'y,
Office
for
Civil
Rights,
U.S.
Dep't
of Educ.),
available at
http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/title9guidanceFinal.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2003).
3. Erik Brady, OpposingCommission Factions TradeBarbs over FinalRecommendations,
USA TODAY, Feb. 27, 2003, at C12 (describing Secretary Paige's announcement that the
Department of Education would "move forward" on the fifteen unanimous recommendations).
4. As explained more fully in Part II, the standards for the commercialization of college
sports are set by a handful of Division I athletic programs. "Division I" is a designation of the
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA). To obtain this designation members of
Division I
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Instead, the Commission continued the long-standing tradition of blaming
Title IX for the shrinking opportunities in athletics for men when, in
reality, the burgeoning arms race in football and men's basketball is the
cause.
While the actual number of men participating in collegiate
athletics has steadily increased during the thirty years of Title IX's
tenure, men's opportunities have become increasingly restricted to fewer
and fewer sports.6 Thus, men's athletic opportunities are shrinking in the
sense that the diversity of their opportunities is shrinking. Although the
number of varsity collegiate slots for men has vastly increased in the last
thirty years, 7 these slots are increasingly concentrated in football and, to a
lesser extent, basketball, baseball and soccer. 8 Opportunities to
participate in the "so called" men's minor sports - wrestling,
gymnastics, swimming, tennis, golf, track, cross-country, and fencing have been reduced significantly. 9 Secretary Paige's Commission
collected voluminous, often heart wrenching, testimony from male
athletes, parents and coaches who were adversely affected by these
eliminations.10 Despite this testimony, the Commission paid scant
attention to the actual cause of men's team cuts. Instead, the
Commission relied upon the witnesses' emotional messages to fire an
attack on Title IX.
The Commission's February 2003 report11 recommended
substantial revisions to Title IX's regulations and enforcement policies.
have to sponsor at least seven sports for men and seven for women (or six for
men and eight for women) with two team sports for each gender.... Schools
that have football are classified as Div. I-A or I-AA.... Div. I-A teams have
to meet minimum [spectator] attendance requirements . . . . [All] Div. I

schools must meet minimum financial aid awards for their athletics program,
and there are maximum financial aid awards for each sport that a Div. I
school cannot exceed.
NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, WHAT'S THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DIVISIONS 1, 11, AND III?

1, http//:www.ncaa.org/about/divcriteria.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2003) (on file with
MARGINS: Maryland's Law Journal on Race, Religion, Gender and Class).
5.

U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-297, INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: FOUREXPERIENCES ADDING AND DISCONTINUING TEAMS 10-11 (Mar. 2001)
[hereinafter 2001 GAO REPORT].
YEAR COLLEGES'

6.
7.
8.
9.

Id.
See infra notes 124-128 and accompanying text.
2001 GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 10-11.
Id. at 11; Welch Suggs, Cuttingthe Field: As Colleges Eliminate Teams, the Lessons

Athletes Learn Are Losing Out to CommercialInterests, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 6, 2003, at
A37.
10.

See THE SEC'Y OF EDUCATION'S COMM'N ON OPPORTUNITY IN ATHLETICS, "OPEN TO

ALL": TITLE IX AT THIRTY 8-11 (Feb. 28, 2003) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT], availableat
http://www.ed.gov/aboutibdscomm/list/athletics/index.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2003).
11. Id.
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As cogently delineated by Jocelyn Samuels, 12 the proposed changes
would have vastly undercut gender equity in athletics, most significantly
by diluting the substantial proportionality test 13 for compliance with Title
IX. 14 Moreover, by imposing upon female athletes the burden of proving
that an interest in equality exists before any protections could be invoked,
the proposed amendments would have turned civil rights protections on
their heads.' 5
Thus, the Commission's proposed regulatory amendments would
have set a far reaching and dangerous precedent. By undercutting gender
equality in athletics, the result of the Commission's recommendations
would have reduced athletic opportunities for women. Further, by
ignoring the true cause of the shrinking diversity of opportunities in
athletics for men, the Commission's recommendations would not have
increased or diversified opportunities for men. Secretary Paige's
Commission. thus failed to do anything but recommend further
restrictions on opportunity in athletics for men and women. Fortunately,
the Commission's recommendations were rejected. Unfortunately, after a
year of study, public hearings and media attention, there is no greater
awareness of the major impediment to opportunity in college athletics:
the .commercialization of football and men's basketball and the
concentration of resources in those sports.
Part I of this article provides a brief review of the legislative
history of Title IX and its implementing regulations, revealing that from
its inception, the guarantee of gender equality was to be realized within
the context of the status quo ante16 of men's commercial college football
and basketball. Part II of this article examines the "Arms Race"- the
economics and driving philosophy of Division I football and men's
12. Jocelyn Samuels, Reviewing the Play: How Faulty PremisesAffected the Work of the
Commission on Opportunityin Athletics and Why Title IXProtectionsAre Still Needed to Ensure
Equal Opportunity in Athletics, 3 MARGINS 233 (2003).
13. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) issued a Policy
Interpretation in 1979 setting out three tests to determine whether a collegiate sports program
effectively "accommodate[s] the interests and abilities of members of both sexes" under 34 C.F.R.
§ 106.41 (c)(1). Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; a Policy Interpretation; Title IX
and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (Dec. 11, 1979) [hereinafter 1979 Policy
Interpretation]. The first test is commonly referred to as the "substantial proportionality test."
See, e.g., Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 166 n.7 (1st Cir. 1996). It poses the question
"[wihether intercollegiate level participation opportunities for male and female students are
provided in numbers substantially proportionate to their respective enrollments." 1979 Policy
Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,418.
14. See Samuels, supra note 12, at 243-46.
15. Id. at 249-53.
16. The situation that existed before something else (being discussed) occurred. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1141 (7th ed. 2000).
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basketball.17 Part III provides a case study of West Virginia University
(WVU), a member of the Big East Conference of NCAA Division I,
where one women's team and four minor men's teams were recently
eliminated as part of a long term plan to increase the revenues produced
by the football and men's basketball programs. Part IV, "The Title IX
Scapegoat," examines the tendency to blame Title IX for cuts to men's
teams and concludes that the blame is misplaced. Part V suggests
reforms to genuinely expand athletic opportunities for men and women
and offers an explanation for why these reforms face tremendous
opposition. Alternatively, Part V suggests that universities should
reclaim their academic missions by selling off their major commercial
collegiate football and men's basketball teams. This article concludes
that Secretary Paige was wise to reject the Commission's
recommendations, but suggests that there is much more work to be done.

I. TITLE IX DID NOT ALTER THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF MEN'S
FOOTBALL OR BASKETBALL

When Congress enacted Title IX in 1972, guaranteeing gender
equality in federally funded educational institutions, its application to
athletics was barely considered.1 8 Title IX was intended to end the
systematic discrimination against women in higher education, including
the quotas limiting the numbers of women in colleges and universities,
the higher standards for admission faced by women applicants, and the
17. For simplicity's sake, this article refers to Division I schools generally and does not
make distinctions among them. It should be noted that not all Division I schools are equal when it
comes to commercialization. For example, the Division I men's basketball league - the Patriot
League - stands out as "The Last Amateurs" in an increasingly professionalized environment. See
generally JOHN FEINSTEIN, THE LAST AMATEURS: PLAYING FOR GLORY AND HONOR IN DIVISION I

COLLEGE BASKETBALL (2000) (describing the formation of the Patriot League and its unique
existence as one of Division I basketball's few remaining conferences that offers largely needbased scholarships and emphasizes the thrill of competition to attract athletes). However, the
reality is that the most professionalized Division I schools with the biggest budgets set the
standard for all of Division I. This standard trickles down to Division II, and even to high school
sports as well. See JAMES J. DUDERSTADT, INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS AND THE AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY: A UNIVERSITY PRESIDENT'S PERPSECTIVE 141 (2000) (stating that the growth of

college football programs in the 1960s led high school football programs "down the same
expensive path"); NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, WHAT'S THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN

DIVISIONS I, II, AND III? 1 (explaining how Division II teams often compete against Division I
teams since they are required to play at least fifty percent of their games against Div. II, or I-A or
I-AA opponents), at http//:www.ncaa.org/about/div-criteria.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2003) (on
file with MARGINS: Maryland's Law Journal on Race, Religion, Gender and Class).
18. Suzanne Sangree, Title IX and the ContactSports Exemption: GenderStereotypes in a
Civil Rights Statute, 32 CONN. L. REV. 381, 387 (2000).
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near total exclusion of women from graduate schools and certain
professions. 19 Title IX's legislative history reveals that athletics were
scarcely mentioned, and then easily dismissed, as if unworthy of
Congressional floor time.2 °
Soon after its enactment, however, women's advocates began to
push for Title IX to apply to school athletics. 2' By 1973, the federal
22
government showed signs that it would adopt this application.
Previously uninvolved in Title IX politics, the National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA) responded by allocating major lobbying
resources to the objective of insulating collegiate athletics, specifically
men's football and basketball programs, from gender equity
requirements. 23 Walter Byers, then NCAA executive director, was
quoted in the Washington Post in 1973 as saying that Title IX stood for
arn later, an
the "possible doom of intercollegiate athletics. ,,24 A year
19. "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under any educational
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000). See
generallyDiscriminationAgainst Women: Hearingson Sec. 805 ofH.R. 16098 Before the Special
Subcomm. on Educ. of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor,Part1, 91 st Cong. (1970) (offering
testimony from the hearings on a precursor bill that sought to amend Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 to include gender as a prohibited basis for discrimination in federally supported
education). As documented in Representative Edith Green's opening remarks, "women in the
United States constitute[d] only 9 percent of all full professors, 8 percent of all scientists, 6.7
percent of all physicians, 3.5 percent of all lawyers, and 1 percent of engineers." Id. at 2.
Women admitted to undergraduate schools were "restricted to those who [were] especially well
qualified" whereas there was "no similar restriction for male students." Id. at 3 (internal citation
omitted). Representative Green explained, "[in] the State of Virginia, I am advised, during a 3year period, 21,000 women were turned down for college entrance, while not one male student
was rejected." Id.
20. 117 CONG. REc. 30,407 (1971) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh). During the brief floor
debate on an earlier, identical, 1971 version of Title IX, Senator Bayh assured Senator Dominick,
"I do not read this... [to] mandate[] the desegregation of the football fields." Id.
21. See, e.g., Prohibitionof Sex Discrimination,1975: Hearings on S.2106 Before the
Subcomm. on Educ. of the Senate Comm. on Labor andPublic Welfare, 94th Cong. 95 (1976)
(statement of Peggy Burke, President Elect of Ass'n for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women
(AIAW) Delegate Assembly) (referring to the AIAW's position that Title IX covered athletics).
22. Sex DiscriminationRegulations:Hearingsfor Review ofRegulationsto Implement Title
IX of Public Law 92-318 Conducted Pursuantto Sec. 431 of the GeneralEducationProvisions
Act Before the Subcomm. on PostsecondaryEduc. of the House Comm. on Educ. andLabor,94th
Cong. 438 (1975) [hereinafter Sex Discrimination Regulations] (statement of Caspar W.
Weinberger, Sec'y of Dep't of Health, Educ. and Welfare) (explaining that even before 1974, the
Dep't of Health, Educ. and Welfare took the position that Title IX covered athletics because it
was directly modeled after Title VI which did cover athletics).
23. Sangree, supra note 18, at 413-14.
24. Linda Jean Carpenter, The Impact of Title IX on Women's IntercollegiateSports, in
GOVERNMENT AND SPORT: THE PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES 62, 63 (Arthur T. Johnson & James H. Frey

eds., 1985) (quoting Bart Barnes & N. Scannell, No Sporting Chance: The Girls in the Locker
Room, WASH. POST,May 12, 1974, at A14).
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observer noted, "[t]he NCAA is frank to admit the tremendous lobbying
effort they have been making to have athletics removed from [Title' 25
IX]
because they feel they cannot exist with the present interpretation."
The NCAA found a ready ally in Senator John Tower from Texas,
who proposed several amendments to Title IX in 1974 and early 1975 to
exempt all athletics from complying with Title IX.2 6 Failing in that
endeavor, Senator Tower proposed an amendment to exempt any
intercollegiate activity "that provided gross receipts or donations" to its
host college or university. 27 This amendment sought to exempt the socalled revenue producing sports -men's football and basketball. 28 These
and similar efforts eventually led to the insertion of the contact sports
exemption into the regulations implementing Title IX in athletic
programs, thus preventing qualified, skilled and experienced female
athletes from the opportunity to compete with men based upon ability in
most sports. 29 However, efforts to completely exclude college football
and basketball from Title IX's overall enforcement structure were
opposed by civil rights advocates and ultimately failed.
Caspar Weinberger, then Secretary of the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (HEW), the federal agency responsible for issuing
the Title IX athletic regulations, sought to assuage fears that Title IX
meant the end of college football and basketball. In 1975, when
announcing the athletic regulations that explicitly exempted contact
sports, Secretary Weinberger explained:
With regard to athletics ...[1]et's look first at what the

regulation does not require because there seems to be a
25. Id. at 64 (quoting Memorandum from Carole E. Gordon, to AIAW Executive Board 2-4
(Mar. 20, 1974)).
26. Sangree, supra note 18, at 414 (citing 120 CONG. REC. 15,322 (1974) (remarks of Sen.
John Tower)).
27. 120 CONG. REC. 15,322 (1974) (discussion modifying Sen. Tower's Amendment No.
1343). See generally Sangree, supra note 18, at 414 (charting the history of Sen. Tower's
attempts to modify Title IX). Senator Tower's proposed Title IX amendment met staunch
opposition. See, e.g., 121 CONG. REc. 29,792-95 (1975) (testimony of Margy DuVal,
Intercollegiate Ass'n of Women Students).
28. See discussion infra Part II (explaining the economics of Division I football and
basketball).
29. The regulations applying Title IX to athletics exempt "contact sports" from the
prohibition against treating persons differently on account of sex or providing athletics separately
on the basis of sex. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (2002). Contact sports are defined as "boxing,
wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball, and other sports the purpose or major activity of
which involves bodily contact." Id. Because almost all sports involve body contact and risk of
injury, the catch-all phrase holds the capacity to swallow the rule. See generally Sangree, supra
note 18.
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substantial misunderstanding about that ....
[I]t does not
require women to play football with men; ...it will not
result in the dissolution of athletic programs for men...
[and] it does not mean the National Collegiate Athletic
Association will be dissolved
and will have to fire all of
30
staff.
vocal
highly
its
Weinberger's reassurances point to the problem that we now
confront. Title IX did nothing to alter the commercialization of men's
basketball and football, sports that were already multi-billion dollar
entertainment industries in Division I schools, subsidized by their host
academic institutions. Division I college football and basketball teams
function as unpaid farm teams for the professional leagues. 31 To make
matters worse, these farm teams are engaged in what commonly has been
referred to as an "Arms Race."32 The resulting financial pressures
squeeze out other men's sports and vastly circumscribe what Title IX can
accomplish. Many who study college athletics, including Secretary
Paige's Commission, decry these distortions. However, because college
football and men's basketball are considered sacrosanct, few identify
those sports as the cause of men's teams cuts and intractable gender
imbalance. From the beginning of Title IX, there was a gentleman's
agreement not to examine the trees, so now it is difficult to see the forest.

II. THE ARMS RACE

It is widely recognized that Division I football and men's
basketball programs have been engaged in an "Arms Race" of escalating
expenditures in the hope of producing winning teams and increased
revenues.33 Escalating expenditures on men's basketball and football
30. Sex Discrimination Regulations, supra note 22, at 438-439 (statement of Caspar
Weinberger, Sec'y of the Dep't of Health, Educ. and Welfare).

31.

In baseball for example', a farm team is a "minor league team associated with ... a

major-league team as a subsidiary." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 421-22 (10th
ed. 1993). Athletes on farm teams are professional players who are paid for their work as they are
culled and developed for the major leagues. As it is now, college football and basketball
programs function as a "free feeder system" for the professional leagues. John Romano,
UnderclassExodus? Forget It, ST.PETERSBURG TIMES (Sept. 25, 2003), at 1C.
32. E.g., COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 25, 35 (Recommendation 8). See also
discussion infra Part II.
33. E.g., DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF
HIGHER EDUCATION 38-39 (2003); COMM'N ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, KNIGHT FOUND., A
CALL TO ACTION: RECONNECTING COLLEGE SPORTS AND HIGHER EDUCATION (June 2001)
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programs is fueled by a circular but flawed logic. Revenue depends upon
winning; since fans do not fill the stands for losing teams, losing teams
do not get into the most lucrative tournaments or bowls and they do not
bring home winner's purses.34 Losing teams also do not receive proceeds
from big television contracts. 35 Since winning is everything, the
[hereinafter KNIGHT FOUNDATION REPORT], available at http://www. knightfdn.org/default.asp
DONNA DE VARONA & JULIE FOUDY, MINORITY VIEWS ON THE REPORT
OF THE COMMISSION ON OPPORTUNITY IN ATHLETICS 8-9 (Feb. 2003) [hereinafter MINORITY

(last visited Oct. 27, 2003);

REPORT], available at http://www.womensportsfoundation.org/cgi-bin/iowa/issues/rights (last
visited Nov. 26, 2003); DUDERSTADT, supra note 17, at 140-45.
Preliminary data from a NCAA empirical study of college sports indicate that since 1985,
mean operating expenditures on football and men's basketball has increased, as has overall
spending on women's sports, while spending on non-revenue producing men's sports has
declined. ROBERT E. LITAN ET AL., THE EMPIRICAL EFFECTS OF COLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: AN
INTERIM REPORT 16 (Aug. 2003) (commissioned by the National Collegiate Athletic Association)
[hereinafter NCAA INTERIM REPORT]. While the study did not break out figures for men's
basketball, mean spending per Division I-A football team has increased from $4.7 million in 1993
to $6.3 million in 2001. Id. at 17. Moreover, the data indicate, football spending has grown
disproportionately rapidly at the schools that spend the most on football. Id. It is important to
note that these figures compare only operating budget expenditures, and do not account for capital
expenditures, which are generally very high for the revenue sports. The report notes, "[ilt is
important to emphasize that the existence of an 'arms race' may be concentrated in capital
expenditures, which are not adequately recorded in the [study] data." Id. at 6. See also JAMES L.
SHULMAN & WILLIAM G. BOWEN, THE GAME OF LIFE: COLLEGE SPORTS AND EDUCATIONAL

VALUES 257 (2001) (stating that expenditures on college sports "just keep going up"). An earlier
NCAA report found that during the eight year period from 1978 to 1985, athletic expenses at all
Division I schools had increased by more than 100%. Law v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134
F.3d 1010, 1012-13 (10th Cir. 1998). As a case in point, West Virginia University's football
budget has increased dramatically in recent years. See discussion infra Part Il.
34. Football teams that are invited to participate in post-season "bowl" games (such as the
Rose Bowl, the Orange Bowl and the Peach Bowl) receive large payments for appearing and even
larger sums for winning. MURRAY SPERBER, COLLEGE SPORTS INC.: THE ATHLETIC DEPARTMENT
vs. THE UNIVERSITY 42-43 (1990) [hereinafter COLLEGE SPORTS INC.]. For example, in 1987,

Indiana University received $800,000 for each appearance in the All-American Bowl and the
Peach Bowl. Id. at 43. Likewise, men's basketball teams that qualify to play in the NCAA
tournament are paid for participating, with the payments increasing depending upon many games
they win. For example Arizona made it to the final four round of the tournament in 1988 and
received a purse of $1,153,000 in 1988. Id. at 42. However, football teams and basketball teams
must share their winnings with other schools' teams according to formula established by their
conferences. Id. See also DUDERSTADT, supra note 17, at 13 1. West Virginia University football
received $400,000 for participating in the Gator Bowl in 1997. See Bowl Money to Assist School
with
Title
IX
Compliance,
NCAA
NEWS,
Dec.
23,
1996,
http://www.ncaa.org/news/1996/961223/active/3346nO7.html (last visited Dec. 1,2003) (on file
with MARGINS: Maryland's Law Journal on Race, Religion, Gender and Class). WVU received
between $1.3 and $1.5 million for its Gator Bowl appearance one year in the 1990's. Christmas
Comes Early, Mountaineers Headed to Jacksonville for New Year's Day Bowl,
http://www.nis.wvu.edu/ReleasesOld/gator.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2003) (on file with
MARGINS: Maryland's Law Journal on Race, Religion, Gender and Class).
35. Cf DUDERSTADT, supra note 17, at 73-75 (describing the advent of televised broadcasts
of college sports games); SHULMAN & BOWEN, supra note 33, at 248 (describing how ABC
substituted the USC-UCLA game for the Berkeley-Stanford game in 1996, after Stanford lost to
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prevailing philosophy is that if you spend more, you win more. 36 As a
general matter, expenses always increase to outstrip revenues
generated.37 Therefore, winning teams can justify lavish renovations to
stadiums and training facilities, huge coaching staffs, head coach
remuneration that rivals NBA 38 and NFL 39 coaches' salaries, 40 first class
travel and accommodations for men's teams on the road4 and country
club dormitories.42 Furthermore, once one school builds luxury sky
43
boxes in its football stadium, all of the competing schools soon follow.
Losing schools can justify these same expenses by explaining that if they
want to play like the "big boys," they must spend like the "big boys."
One must invest in order to build toward a winning team. a4 Armed with
these arguments, athletic directors justify increases in football and men's
basketball budgets, at the expense of other sports and academic
programs.
Contrary to the prevalent myth that men's revenue producing
sports actually produce net revenue, the arms race financially drains host
universities.4 5 When Division I teams have good years and are winning
tournament purses and filling their stadiums, they make money. Teams,
however, generally spend what they earn in good years, acting under the
prevailing philosophy that spending more equals winning more, and
winning is everything. 46 Furthermore, even in good years, some of these
Oregon State, which meant that USC and UCLA each received $150,000 in television revenues).
36. However, preliminary data from a NCAA commissioned report indicate that increased
spending on football or men's basketball does not produce increases in winning percentages, and
increases in winning records does not produce increases in net operating revenue. NCAA
INTERIM REPORT, supra note 33, at 4. The study analyzed only operating expenses and not capital
expenditures. Id. at 6-7. Because football and basketball require costly infrastructures, the
recorded expenditures would have been significantly higher had capital investments been
included.
37. DUDERSTADT, supra note 17, at 146.
38. National Basketball Association.
39. National Football League.
40. DUDERSTADT, supra note 17, at 156. ("When an occasional concern floats up ... the
athletic director or the sports press responds that, relative to the world of professional sports,
[college sports coaches'] compensation seems reasonable. College sports and professional sports
are both part of the same market for top coaches.").
41. Id. at 142.
42. Id. at 142.
43. COLLEGE SPORTS INC., supra note 34, at 133 (quoting Bob Bockrath, assistant athletic
coach at the Univ. of Ariz.).
44. See, e.g., BOK, supra note 33, at 38-39; DUDERSTADT, supra note 17, at 135-36;
discussion infra Part III (discussing the prevailing attitude that universities need to invest heavily
in order produce a winning team).
45. DUDERSTADT, supra note 17, at 133-40. Derek Bok refers to this myth as "The Chimera
of Profitability." BOK, supra note 33, at 38.
46. DUDERSTADT, supra note 17, at 136.
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winning Division I schools 47 do not break even when utilizing traditional
accounting methods and considering the cost of construction and
maintenance of stadiums and other infrastructure.48 Some schools pay
for debt servicing out of athletic revenues, but many do not.49
Additionally, the costs of athletic scholarships are sometimes recorded at
in-state tuition rates for athletes from out-of-state. 50 Also, some coaches'
and personnel salaries come out of general university operating expenses
51
and not the expenses of the team they service.
In "off years," and in most years for most schools, men's football
and basketball do not break even. 52 Most teams usually run deficits, yet
because the university is there to bail them out, they need not account for
these deficits.53 Although football and men's basketball programs are
47. BOK, supra note 33, at 38.
Although many Division I schools claim to make money on their football and
basketball programs, many do not, especially if the capital costs of their
facilities are accurately counted. Only a handful of universities, such as
Florida State and Notre Dame - perhaps no more than ten to twenty in all make a profit on their entire athletic programs ....
Id.
48. See generally SHULMAN & BOWEN, supra note 33, at 250.
What can be said with confidence is that taking account of the imbedded
capital costs of athletic facilities would surely reverse any appearance of
financial 'profit' associated with even the most successful big-time program.
Inter-collegiate athletics is a highly capital-intensive activity, and it is
foolish to talk (and act) as if these costs did not exist.
Id.
See also DUDERSTADT, supra note 17, at 133 ("[M]ost intercollegiate athletics programs at
most colleges and universities require some subsidy from general university resources.... [M]ost
college athletics programs actually lose money, to the tune of $245 million for Division I schools
in 1995-96."); id. at 146 (describing the hidden costs of collegiate athletics).
49.

COLLEGE SPORTS INC., supra note 34, at 131-33.

50. DUDERSTADT, supra note 17, at 141.
51. Id. at 145-46; see generally COLLEGE SPORTS INC., supra note 34, at 92-145.
52. BOK, supra note 33, at 38-39. Indeed it is exceedingly difficult to institute a business
plan to ensure profitability within the context of the arms race. Its imperative is to spend all that
is earned. See WALTER BYERS, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: EXPLOITING COLLEGE ATHLETES

340-41 (1995) (describing increased spending in college sports as a never-ending cycle);
DUDERSTADT, supra note 17, at 141 (discussing the escalation of spending on college football);
SHULMAN & BOWEN, supra note 33, at 256-57 ("[Ilnstances of true profitability are exceedingly
rare - in fact, probably nonexistent if capital costs are counted .... As a money-making venture,
athletics is bad business."); MURRAY SPERBER, BEER AND CIRCUS: How BIG-TIME COLLEGE
SPORTS IS CRIPPLING UNDERGRADUATE EDUCATION 27, 219-29 (2000) [hereinafter BEER AND
CIRCUS] (discussing the fact that college sports operate in the red); ANDREW ZIMBALIST, UNPAID
PROFESSIONALS: COMMERCIALISM AND CONFLICT IN BIG-TIME COLLEGE SPORTS 150 (1999)

(describing how most NCAA schools' sports programs do not have surpluses).

53. See, e.g., Ray Glier, Tulane FootballStays in Division I-A, N.Y. TIMES, June 11,2003,
at C23 (detailing the Tulane Board of Trustees rejection of a proposal to drop its Division I-A
football team despite an athletic department deficit of $6.7 million and football losses of more
than one million dollars per year); see also infra note 83.
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self-supporting in a handful of schools,54 it is clear that the vast majority
of Division I programs survive because of university subsidies, usually
multi-million dollar subsidies. 55 This is troubling, since the enterprise
that is subsidized is commercial, not academic.
Are these big subsidies worthwhile to the universities? Operating
multi-million dollar entertainment industries within nonprofit academic
institutions drains schools financially and greatly distorts their culture,
including student life, the academic enterprise and, most relevant to the
present discussion, athletics for minor sports athletes. Many of the big
sports schools also develop reputations as "party schools. 56 Academics
are undermined with doctored admissions standards, gut courses and
sham majors,57 and university life becomes organized around what one
commentator termed "Beer and Circus., 58 The salubrious purposes of
college athletics - to instill a sense of school unity, to provide students
with opportunities for healthy exercise, to develop leadership, to promote
54. Even these programs are probably not "self-supporting" when capital costs are counted.
& BOWEN, supra note 33, at 256-57. However, it is exceedingly difficult to factor in
capital costs because none of the reported data from schools includes capital costs. See NCAA
INTERIM REPORT, supra note 33, at 6-7.
55. WVU athletic officials estimate that Rutgers athletics receives from $12 to $14 million
annually from its university. Interview with Michael Parsons, WVU Deputy Director of
Athletics, in Morgantown, W. Va. (May 5, 2003) [hereinafter Parsons Interview]. The University
of Pittsburgh routinely covers its athletic department's deficits each year. Id. Duke's basketball
team receives $5 million annually in school subsidy; Vanderbilt, Northwestern and Tulane each
receive between $6 and $12 million annually. SHULMAN & BOWEN, supra note 33, at 248 (adding
that "[n]o positive 'bottom line' result obtains from most Division IA schools"). See also Law v.
Nat' ICollegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1012 (discussing how the NCAA Raiborn report
of 1985 found that 51% of Division I schools responding to NCAA inquiries on the subject
suffered a net loss in their basketball programs alone that averaged $145,000 per school);
COLLEGE SPORTS INC., supra note 34, at 130-37; DUDERSTADT, supra note 17, at 146; Suggs,
supra note 9, at A37 ("Neither football nor basketball teams pay their own way except at the very
largest and richest colleges, the ones with huge stadiums and lucrative television contracts").
56. See, e.g., BEER AND CIRCUS, supra note 52, at 57-59 (detailing the correlation between
the University of Oregon's rise in annual "Party School" lists and its improved success in
intercollegiate athletics). Some critics believe that big time athletic programs foster a climate of
"privilege and leniency" for an institution's top athletes, creating a class of students who operate
largely beyond the law. See, e.g., Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779,
782 (D. Va. 1996) (chronicling the rape of a female student by two varsity football players and
the university's failure to punish one offender and minimal punishment of the other), rev 'd 132
F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000);
SHULMAN & BOWEN, supra note 33, at 418-19 n.5 (reviewing instances of student athletes who
were accorded differential academic standards and the allegations that two Naval Academy
football players had raped a female midshipman).
57. BOK, supra note 33, at 41-46, 54 ("[T]he saga of big-time athletics reveals that
American universities, despite their lofty ideals, are not above sacrificing academic values - even
values as basic as admissions standards and the integrity of their courses - in order to make
money.").
58. BEER AND CIRCUS, supra note 52.
SHULMAN
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teamwork and character through team sports5 9 and to cultivate alumni
61
loyalty 6 ° - are all better met by smaller scale athletic programs.
Universities do not need huge stadiums, television audiences and an
upper caste of semi-professional athletes masquerading as students 62 to
achieve these purposes.
It is widely believed that the publicity and excitement of a
televised winning team attracts more applicants and better students.
Studies from the 1970's onward have demonstrated that such beliefs are
unfounded. 63 There is no association between winning seasons and
increases in either numbers of applicants or heightened SAT scores of
incoming students. 64 It is also a myth that athletic scholarships are an
effective way of enhancing educational opportunities to underprivileged
or minority youth. For one thing, athletic scholarships are not needbased. 65 Further, while it is true that many college teams are heavily
dominated by African-American athletes, especially football and
basketball, these athletes' graduation rates are abysmally low.66 Most
minority student athletes do not graduate college within four or five
years, if at all. Only 35% of Division I-A African-American basketball
players graduated within six years in 199567 and only 40% graduated in

59.

DUDERSTADT, supra note 17, at 89-90; Suggs, supra note 9, at A38.

60. Cf DUDERSTADT, supranote 17, at 129 (explaining that the alumni loyalty generated by
watching sports almost always results in gifts to sports programs, not the university at large or to
academic programs, and how it is fickle giving coming only on the heels of winning seasons);
Welch Suggs, Oil Tycoon Pledges Millions to Okla. State, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 28,2003,
at A27 (describing donation of $55 million to Oklahoma State University by an alumnus, $20
million of which was designated for a trust fund to help fund refurbishment of the football field).
61. See BOK, supra note 33, at 46-51.
62. Suggs, supra note 9, at A37 ("Barely half of Division I football players earn their
degrees within six years of entering college .... Only 43 percent of basketball players do.").
63. BOK, supra note 33, at 48 (reporting several studies in the 1970's and 1980's that found
that success in football and basketball does not raise the average SAT scores of students in school
involved); NCAA INTERIM REPORT, supra note 33 (NCAA commissioned report reviewing data
from Division I schools for 8 years makes preliminary conclusion that increased expenditures on
sports does not affect SAT scores of incoming students); ZIMBALIST, supra note 52, at 176
(describing study covering years 1981-1995 concluded average SAT scores of incoming students
do not improve when a schools basketball and football teams have winning seasons).
64. NCAA INTERIM REPORT, supra note 33.
65. SHULMAN & BOWEN, supra note 33, at 420 n. 12 (citing Debra E. Blum, Colleges Weigh
Aid to Athletes Based on Need: Financial Problems Lead to Revival of an Old Idea, but
Skepticism Remains, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 2, 1992 (online edition)).
66. These figures represent significant improvements over previous years. See Athlete
Graduation Rates Continue to
Climb, NCAA
NEWS
(Sept
1, 2003),
http://www.ncaa.org/2003/20030901/active/4018n01 html (last visited Dec. 1,2003) (on file with
MARGINS: Maryland's Law Journal on Race, Religion, Gender and Class).
67. Id.
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1996 after six or fewer years. 68 African-American football players fared
somewhat better, graduating 49% in 1996.69 Although these graduation
rates do not vary greatly from non-athlete graduation rates, 70 perhaps
non-athletes' graduation rates would improve if more African-American
non-athletes were supported by scholarships and freed from the need to
work while studying. Similarly, student athlete graduation rates might
increase if scholarship athletes had schedules that gave them more time to
attend classes and study. As Derek Bok so aptly concludes, "any
university sincerely wishing to educate more minority students would do
far better to offer regular scholarships to the best applicants they can find
rather than recruit athletes with poor academic credentials and then
subject them to the pressures and distractions of high-profile college
sports.'

Title IX did not cause the problems of commercialization,
corruption and the distortion of the academic enterprise, nor can it stop
them. The first female professional physical educators decried these
problems in the late nineteenth century. 72 These problems were also
documented by the Carnegie Foundation Commission report in 1929, 73 in
succeeding commission reports 74 and in other articles, 75 most recently in
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. BOK, supra note 33, at 48.
72. SUSAN K. CAHN, COMING ON STRONG: GENDER AND SEXUALITY INTWENTIETH-CENTURY
WOMEN'S SPORT 23-25 (1994); DONALD J. MROZEK, SPORT AND AMERICAN MENTALITY, 18801910, at 152-53 (1983) (detailing the tendency by early female physical educators to deemphasize the appeal of women's athletics to spectators in favor of ensuring its utility as effective
physical education).
73. MURRAY SPERBER, ONWARD TO VICTORY: THE CRISES THAT SHAPED COLLEGE SPORTS 30
(1998) (citing BULLETIN 23 OF THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF HIGHER
EDUCATION (1929), a report that summarized a five year comprehensive study of college athletics
in the U.S. and Canada concluding recruiting had become corrupt, professionals had replaced
amateurs, education was being neglected, and commercialism reigned). Henry Pritchett, director
of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Higher Education stated, "The question is not
so much whether athletics in their present form should be fostered by the university, but how fully
can a university that fosters professional athletics discharge its primary [educational] function?"
Id.

74.

BOYER

COMM'N ON

EDUCATING UNDERGRADUATES

IN THE RESEARCH

UNIV.,

REINVENTING UNDERGRADUATE EDUCATION: A BLUEPRINT FOR AMERICA'S RESEARCH
UNIVERSITIES (1998); COLLEGE SPORTS INC., supra note 34, at 333-34 (describing a 1983
American Council on Education Presidents' Proposal recommending that a "Presidents' Board"
take charge of the NCAA and that this board "have authority to veto or modify NCAA rules and
to impose new rules of its own design on association member subject to review only by a mail
vote of presidents of all member institutions"); Text of the Draft Proposalto Createa Boardof
College Presidents,CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 14, 1983, at 24-25.
75. See, e.g., WINGSPREAD GROUP ON HIGHER EDUC., AN AMERICAN IMPERATIVE: HIGHER
EXPECTATIONS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION (1993); BOK, supra note 33, at 38-51. See generally
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the Knight Foundation report of 200 1.76 After coming into effect, Title
IX opened the door for women to develop their athletic talents within the
distorted culture of this commercialization. Nonetheless, Title IX has
proved a ready scapegoat for cuts to minor men's teams.77

III. WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY, 2003: A CASE STUDY
The Title IX drama is playing out now at my home school, West
Virginia University (WVU). When WVU announced in April 2003 that
it would cut four varsity men's teams and one varsity women's team in
order to save $600,000, the lead letter to the editor in the student
newspaper the next day blamed Title IX. 78 While Title IX surely played
a role in guiding these cuts, 79 the primary causes of the budget shortfall
were the product of escalating costs of football and basketball coupled
with diminishing university resources. These economic pressures are
typical of those faced by athletic departments across the country. Indeed,
WVU provides an enlightening case study.
In the spring of 2002, WVU's Athletic Department (AD or
Department) completed a review of its sports programs and budget, and
issued a plan - the Strategic Direction (SD). The SD compared WVU's
spending on men's football and basketball to the other fifteen Big East
81
schools 80 against whom it competes and found that it was next to last.
BYERS, supra note 52; George Vecsey, Sports of The Times: Who's Watching the Store?, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 11, 1984, at B7.
76.

KNIGHT FOUNDATION REPORT, supra note 33, at 4 ("[T]he problems ofbig-time college

sports have grown rather than diminished. The most glaring elements of the problems outlined in
this report - academic transgressions, a financial arms race and commercialization - are all
evidence of the widening chasm between higher educations' ideals and big-time college sports.").
77. See, e.g., Christopher Paul Reuscher, Giving the Bat Back to Casey: Suggestions to
Reform Title IX's Inequitable Application to IntercollegiateAthletics, 35 AKRON L. REv. 117
(2001) (arguing, among other things, that Title IX is responsible for the elimination of lowrevenue men's athletic teams); see also infra notes 78, 116, 122 and accompanying text.
78. Alex Paschalides, Letter to the Editor, Where's the Equality in WVU Sports?, DAILY
ATHENAEUM, Apr. 17, 2003, at 4; see also Suggs, supra note 9, at A38 (recounting WVU men's
tennis coach Ed Dickson's experience of being called into Athletic Director Ed Pastilong's office
to be informed that his team was being eliminated partly because of Title IX).
79. Title IX certainly prevented WVU from making up its projected deficit by eliminating
all women's teams.
80. The Big East Conference includes West Virginia University, Virginia Tech, the
University of Miami, the University of Pittsburgh, Boston College, Syracuse University, Temple
University, Rutgers University, Notre Dame University, St. Johns University, Providence
University, Villanova University, the University of Connecticut, Georgetown University, and
Seton Hall University. See http://www.bigeast.org/about (last visited Nov. 18, 2003) (on file with
MARGINS: Maryland's Law Journal on Race, Religion, Gender and Class). The Big East
recently added five new teams: the University of Cincinnati, DePaul University, Marquette
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The SD concluded that to become more competitive, men's football and
basketball budgets should increase significantly, coaches'
salaries should
82
upgraded.
be
should
facilities
and
be augmented
The Department then considered. possible sources for the
recommended increased spending. It noted that other Big East schools
83
receive multi-million dollar subsidies from their host universities.
Since the late 1980's, WVU Athletics had not received any university
subsidy for its budget, which totaled $27 million for the 2002-03
academic year. 84 In considering possible sources of income, the
Department examined income-generating strategies of other Big East
universities. Notre Dame's Athletic Department profits from its own
television contract and from a $5 million per year product endorsement
contract with Adidas. 85 The AD concluded that such sources of income
were unavailable to WVU Athletics. 86 WVU officials also looked at
schools outside the Big East. Because student enrollments at the
University of Tennessee, University of Texas and University of Florida
are at least twice the size of WVU student enrollment, general student
fees are able to generously subsidize the athletic departments
at those
87
schools without each student paying thousands of dollars.
To raise the needed revenue, the AD increased tickets prices. 88 It
also sought and obtained approval from the University Board of
Governors toissue bonds in order to finance eighteen million dollars of
renovations to the Mountaineer Football Stadium and other facilities. 89
The purpose of the financing was to provide the means for the revenue
University, the University of Louisville, and the University of South Florida. Press Release, Big
East Announces the Addition of Five Marquee Institutions, http://www.bigeast.org/about/I 1-0403.asp (last visited Nov. 18, 2003) (on file with MARGINS: Maryland's Law Journal on Race,
Religion, Gender and Class).
81. Parsons Interview, supra note 55.
82.

Id.

83. Id. (noting that WVU athletic officials estimate that Rutgers athletics receives twelve to
fourteen million dollars annually from its university and that University of Pittsburgh routinely
covers its Athletic Department's deficits each year).
84.

Id. By the early 1980's WVU Athletics obtained only six percent of its budget from

university appropriations. Id. To free itself from university oversight and to assist in its own
private fundraising, WVU Athletics decided to forego all university appropriations. Id. During
the 1988-89 academic year the university withdrew from the athletic department the 150 to 160

tuition waivers that it had previously used to finance that number of athletic scholarships. Id.
From that point on the athletic department became responsible for generating its entire budget.
Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87.

Id.

88. Id.
89. Id.
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generating
sports (men's football and basketball) to generate more
9
revenue.
Then, in 2003, additional unforeseen financial pressures
necessitated further cuts. Facing a huge deficit in 2003, the state
legislature cut appropriations for WVU by $22 million. 9 1 It projected
92
that an additional thirty million dollars would be cut the following year.
To offset these reductions, WVU raised tuition, which significantly
increased the AD's scholarship costs. 93 In addition, the stadium
renovations exceeded the budget and thus necessitated an additional bond
issue in April 2003 to cover the new renovation price tag of $24
million. 94 Some speculated that additional unanticipated salary increases
for the coaching staff added to the increased costs in 2003.9
Indeed, the Department's disclosures indicate that football coach
Rich Rodriguez' salary almost doubled from $405,950 for the 2001-02
year to $700,400 for the 2002-03 year. 96 When the AD replaced the
men's basketball coach last year, the salary for that position rose from
90. WVU athletics officials explained, "they must have better facilities to improve the fans'
experience and to attract high-caliber coaches and players." WVU Expands Scope ofMountaineer
Field Project,New Price Tagfor Renovations: 11 Million, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Apr. 2, 2003,
at 3B. Associate Athletic Director Russ Sharp explained that the new club lounge in the football
stadium for $1.9 million is "'not really designed for watching the game.... It's just an area with
a few more amenities."' Id. Just two weeks later, on April 16, 2003, the WVU athletic
department announced it was eliminating four varsity men's minor teams, and one women's team
in order to save just shy of $600, 000. Andrew J. Beckner, Five Athletic ProgramsCut, DAILY
ATHENAEUM, Apr. 17, 2003, at 1.
91. Lawrence Messina, West Virginia Higher Education Continues to Cut Budgets,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Oct. 13, 2003, at 3A, http://library.cnpapers.com/bgi-bin/texis/search (last

visited Dec. 1, 2003) (on file with MARGINS: Maryland's Law Journal on Race, Religion,
Gender and Class).
92. Bob Hertzel, Why Did They Die? 9-11, Money, Title IX, Changing Tastes All Played
Part, DOMINION POST, May 4, 2003, http://www.dominionpost.com/a/sports/2003/05/04/ab
[hereinafter Why Did They Die?] (last visited Dec. 1, 2003) (on file with MARGINS: Maryland's
Law Journal on Race, Religion, Gender and Class).
93. Id. The increased AD scholarship costs are projected to be $2 million over the five year
period 2003-2008. Parsons Interview, supra note 55.
94. The renovation budget is intended to "upgrade WVU sports facilities and increase
revenue by offering something extra for fans who are willing to pay more. Eleven million of the
24 total is earmarked for luxury skyboxes and a new score board at the football stadium."
Parsons Interview, supra note 55.
95. Bob Hertzel, Mosser Resigns Post; WVU Varsity Club President Protests Cutback,
DOMINION POST, Apr. 23, 2003, http://www.dominionpost.com/a/sports/2003/04/22/aa (last
visited Dec. 1, 2003) (on file with MARGINS: Maryland's Law Journal on Race, Religion,
Gender and Class). The President of the Varsity Club, a booster club of alumni WVU varsity
athletes, resigned after team cuts were announced in April, protesting that the cuts were in part
necessitated by a huge bonus to football coach Rich Rodriguez, who recently had renegotiated his
contract in exchange for not defecting to a competitor school. Id.
96. Why Did They Die?, supra note 92.
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$282,960 to $550,000, a 97% increase. 97 These salary increases are part
of a larger trend of shifting more resources to football and men's
basketball in response to past losing seasons and dwindling spectator
98
attendance.
In 1994, the WVU football budget was $3.4 million, 19% of the
overall AD budget. 99 In 2002, that budget was $5.5 million, or 23% of
the AD budget.100 This combination of foreseen and unforeseen expenses
created a projected AD annual budget shortfall of $600,000.0 All of
these are typical financial demands exerted by football and basketball
programs on their home schools. These financial pressures are likely to
accelerate in the next few years as public universities contend with
budget cuts occasioned by state budget deficits,' 0 2 and as private
universities continue to contend with dwindling endowments and private
donations.
Faced with the projected $600,000 shortfall in 2003, the
Deartmeii again reviewed its potential for increasing revenues.
It
concluded that given the demographics of the state and the characteristics
of its fan base, it could not further increase ticket prices without reducing
attendance and losing net revenue gain. ° 4 With luxury skyboxes already
under construction for the football stadium, the Department knew it had
maximized potential revenue from corporate skyboxes.1 05 Therefore, the
Department's budget shortfall had to be covered through cost
97. Id. Both the basketball head coach and the football head coach have higher salaries
than the University president. Id.
98. Id. The 2001-02 men's basketball season was the worst in school history, "8-20, and
the fourth consecutive season when home attendance, which had peaked at 11,384 in 1982, failed
to reach 6,500 in the 14,000 seat Coliseum." Id. When young coach Rich Rodriguez took over
the football team in that year he produced a losing record of 3-8 and no bowl. Id. In addition to
the coaching salary increases, $100,000 was added to the football team recruitment budget for
2003-04 and $50,000 for men's basketball. Id. See also Suggs, supra note 9. WVU's Mike
Parsons explained, "'We need to have a successful football team because football generates
significant revenue .... If the [Athletic Department] is going to be self-sufficient, we need a
winning team because that means more television appearances, bowl games, better season ticket
sales the next year."' Id at A38.
99. Parsons Interview, supra note 55.
100. Id. It should also be noted that five coaching positions in the "strength staff' are on the
AD books as a separate department. Their combined salaries are $181,593. Id. One can safely
assume that men's basketball and football players benefit from this coaching staffs time, but no
part of these expenses appear in the football or basketball budgets. Id.
101. Id.
102. See Timothy Egan, States, FacingBudget Shortfalls, Cut the Major andthe Mundane,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2003, at A 1; Louis Uchitelle, Red Ink in States Beginningto Hurt Economic
Recovery, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2003, at Al.
103. Parsons Interview, supra note 55.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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reductions. 1
In evaluating potential reductions, the Department considered the
following three options. The first option was an across-the-Department
budget reduction. 10 7 Since many of the Department's costs, such as
building maintenance, are fixed costs paid to the university, these cuts
would fall heavily upon the salaries of AD administrative staff, which
was the same staff making the budget decisions. Understandably, this
option was rejected. 108 The second option was an across-the-board cut to
all team budgets. 109 However, because all team budgets were already
reduced by 5% in the 2000-2001 academic year, the AD rejected this
option, fearing that further reductions would fatally cripple teams'
abilities to compete, consigning them to mediocrity, especially the teams
with small budgets. 110
The final option that prevailed was to make targeted cuts,
eliminating teams based upon their financial impact, their viability and
their past and future success.'" Under this option, the Department
eliminated men's tennis, men's indoor and outdoor track and field, and
the men's cross country teams. 112 The additional cut that caused the most
controversy was the elimination of the men and women's rifle teams,
which were extraordinarily successful, winning thirteen NCAA
championships in the past fifteen years. However, the rifle teams' future
viability was questionable because only forty-three NCAA rifle teams
remain in the United States113 and NCAA rules permit the elimination of
championship play whenever there are forty or fewer NCAA teams
nationwide. 114 The cut saved the Department $19,879.1 15 While the
2004 budget figures are not yet available, it will probably reflect an even
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. See Suggs, supra note 9.
112. See OFFICE OF POSTSECONDARY EDUC., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., INSTITUTION DATA,
PARTICIPANTS AND OPERATING EXPENSES, W. VA. UNIV. (Reporting Year July 1, 2001 - June 30,
2002) (outlining the money saved by cutting men's teams: men's indoor track and field saved

$37,792; men's outdoor track and field saved $26,676; men's cross country saved $9,633; men's
tennis saved $46,703, http://www.ope.ed.gov/athletics/InstDetail.asp (last visited Sept. 7, 2003)
(on file with MARGINS: Maryland's Law Journal on Race, Religion, Gender and Class).

113. Parsons Interview, supra note 55.
114. Id.
115. See OFFICE OF POSTSECONDARY EDUC., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., INSTITUTION DATA,
PARTICIPANTS AND OPERATING EXPENSES, W. VA. UNIV. (Reporting Year July 1, 2001 - June 30,
2002), http://www.ope.ed.gov/athletics/InstDetail.asp (last visited Sept. 7, 2003) (on file with
MARGINS: Maryland's Law Journal on Race, Religion, Gender and Class).
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greater concentration of AD resources in football and men's basketball.

IV. THE TITLE IX SCAPEGOAT

In the spring of 2003, when Ed Dickson, WVU's men's tennis
coach, first learned that his team would be eliminated, he asked, "'Is this
about Title IX?'

116

This is a common reaction to men's team cuts. On a

national scale, the National Wrestling Coaches Association and other
advocates of minor men's sports
also blame Title IX for the elimination
17
teams.'
collegiate
of men's
It is true that WVU's entire $600,000 budget shortfall could have
been covered by eliminating all of the WVU varsity women's teams. 1 8
In fact, it is quite likely that more women's teams would have been
eliminated ahead of men's tennis, cross-country, track and field and rifle
if Title IX was not in effect and enforceable through the substantial
proportionality test. However, even if women's teams were eliminated,
the football/basketball arms race would still require the elimination of
minor men's sports. Indeed, from 1984 to 1988, when the Supreme
Court's decision in Grove City College v. Bell1 19 prevented Title IX from
applying to athletic programs, colleges and universities cut wrestling
teams at a rate almost three times as high as they did in the next twelve
years, 12 after Title IX's application to athletics was reestablished in the
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987.121
This reality has not dispelled the impression that Title IX is to
116. Suggs, supra note 9.
117. See, e.g., Nat'l Wrestling Coaches Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 263 F. Supp. 2d 82
(D.D.C. 2003); Welch Suggs, Defying Rumors, Bush AdministrationDefends Status Quo on Title
IX, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 7, 2002, A41 (explaining how National Wrestling Coaches
Association and three other plaintiffs brought suit against the Department of Education alleging
that its enforcement of Title IX causes the unlawful elimination of men's teams).
118. See OFFICE OF POSTSECONDARY EDUC., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., INSTITUTION DATA,
PARTICIPANTS AND OPERATING EXPENSES, W. VA. UNIV. (Reporting Year July 1,2001 - June 30,
2002) (showing that WVU's total expenditures for women's teams are $620,946 and that it spends
$17,653 on women's cross country), http://www.ope.ed.gov/athletics/InstDetail.asp (last visited
Sept. 7, 2003) (on file with MARGINS: Maryland's Law Journal on Race, Religion, Gender and
Class).
119. 465 U.S. 555 (1984) (holding that Title IX enforcement is limited to the specific school
program receiving federal funding and does not extend to the university or college as a whole).
120. MINORITY REPORT, supra note 33, at 4. During this period, "the number of NCAA
institutions sponsoring men's wrestling teams dropped by 53, from 342 to 289 - or approximately
13.3 teams per year. Between 1988 and 2000, that number dropped by 55, from 289 to 234 - or
approximately 4.6 teams per year." Id. (citing NCAA, 1982-2001 SPORTS SPONSORSHIP AND
PARTICIPATION STATISTICS REPORT 119).
121. Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 3(a), 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1988)).
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blame for the elimination of minor men's sports. As University of
Minnesota wrestling coach J. Robinson explained, "I've been fighting
football and basketball for years. Why can [women] go to the front of the
line ahead of me?"' 122 A 2001 report of the General Accounting Office
(GAO) confirms Robinson's reality, but not his reasoning. The report
found that schools eliminated 2,648 team slots for male wrestlers from
1981 to 1999.123 During that same period, colleges added 7,199 men's
slots for football, as well as 5,452 slots for baseball, 1,932 slots in men's
soccer and 1,552 slots in men's basketball. 124 These increases resulted in
an overall 5% increase in men's athletic slots. 12 5 The increases in

football squads alone more than made up for the cuts in all of the other
men's teams combined. 126 While women still lag behind men in athletic
participation at four-year colleges, the GAO reported that the number of
undergraduate women students participating in athletics increased from
3.9% in 1981 to 5.5% in 1998_99.127 During this time-period, the number
of men participating in college athletics remained relatively steady,
starting and2 8ending the period at 9.3% of the male undergraduate
1
population.

Title IX's proportionality requirement is not the cause for the
elimination of wrestling teams. Rather, the data supports the conclusion
that the augmentation of more popular and more lucrative men's sports,
such as football, baseball, soccer and basketball, is the main cause. 29 In
fighting Title IX, 130 the wrestlers are misplacing the blame. Title IX

merely acts to deflect the hatchet from cutting only women's sports as
cuts are being made, but the hatchet is driven by the scarcity created by
vastly increasing resources for men's football and basketball programs.' 31
122.

Anne Stein, In Sports a New Title Wave of Challengesfor Equity, CH. TRIB., Apr. 25,

2001, at C8.
123.

2001 GAO REPORT, supra note 5, at 10-11 tbl. 2.

124. Id.
125.
126.

Id.
While wrestling lost the greatest number of slots, other men's sports also lost: 1,405

tennis; 1,022 gymnastics; 943 swimming; 773 fencing; 436 rifle; 282 skiing; 151 cross-country;
129 ice hockey; 95 water polo; and 12 badminton. Id. at 11.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Women's gymnastics, field hockey and fencing have also decreased dramatically during

this period. Id. at 9-10 tbl. I (revealing that 683 women's gymnastics, 229 women's field hockey,
and 171 women's fencing slots were eliminated).
130. See, e.g., Nat'l Wrestling Coaches Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 263 F. Supp. 2d 82
(D.D.C. 2003); Welch Suggs, Defying Rumors, Bush AdministrationDefends Status Quo on Title
IX, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 7, 2002, A41 (explaining how National Wrestling Coaches

Association and three other plaintiffs brought suit against the Department of Education alleging
that its enforcement of Title IX causes the unlawful elimination of men's teams).
131.

See, e.g., 2001 GAO REPORT, supra note 5,at 14 (detailing how seventy-two percent of
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The proportionality requirement takes the fall as a mandate to cut so
called "minor" men's teams, but it is really the sacrosanctity of football
and basketball that is the cause.
When Secretary Paige appointed the Commission on Opportunity
in Athletics, he charged it to "improve the effectiveness of Title IX and..
. build upon the extraordinary progress that has resulted from its passage
thirty years ago."' 32 However, the Commission had its own agenda. The
Commission was heavily dominated by representatives of Division I
schools. Ten out of the fifteen commissioners were from NCAA
Division I schools, all of which host large men's football and basketball
programs. 133 There were no representatives from Division II or Division
III colleges, junior colleges or high school athletic programs,' 34 despite
the Commission's Charter requirement that its membership include
people from these constituencies and that the Commission be fairly
balanced. 135 Given the representation on the Commission, it is not
surprising that instead of fulfilling its purpose to build upon the
extraordinary progress that resulted from Title IX's passage thirty years
ago, the Commission instead sought to fix the problems Title IX created
for Division I athletic programs. Specifically, the Commission sought
once again to weaken Title IX's application to athletics and thus
circumvent any pressure to reduce men's football and basketball.
If the Commission's recommendations were enacted in revised
regulations, the commercialization of men's sports and its distortions of
schools surveyed who added women's teams did so without cutting any men's teams). While
about a third of the surveyed colleges discontinued one or more men's teams, the same number of
all categories of four year colleges also added men's teams in all categories except Division I-A
schools. Id. at 16 tbl. 5. Only three percent of schools with big commercial football and

basketball teams added men's teams. Id. The failure of Division I-A schools to add a significant
number of men's teams is due to the fact that so many additional male athletic slots have been
created by the expansion of the size of football teams. See generallyDUDERSTADT, supranote 17,
at 141 (describing the rapid growth in the size of college football programs in the 1960's, and the

subsequent transformation of college football into a "corporate and bureaucratic enterprise, with
teams of over one hundred players").
132.
133.
134.

COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, app. 3 at 47 (Commission Charter).
Birch Bayh, Don't Tamper with Title IX, BALT. SuN, Feb. 3, 2003, at 15A.
MINORITY REPORT, supra note 33, at 19.

135.

COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, app. 3 at 47 (Commission Charter).
The members shall include representatives of college, university, and school
district officials, such as athletic directors, coaches, and other faculty, and
representatives of intercollegiate and secondary school athletes; and may
include researchers, state and local officials, and other persons with special
expertise in intercollegiate and secondary school athletics or issues of equal
educational opportunity. The membership of the Commission will be fairly
balanced to reflect representation of a wide range of interests and
perspectives relating to men's and women's (and boys' and girls') athletics.
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the academic enterprise would have remained untouched. However, as
elucidated by Jocelyn Samuels, the Commission's recommendations
would have inflicted grave damage to the goal of building gender
equality and to civil rights law in general. 136 In addition, the
Commission's recommendations would have altered Title IX generally,
not exclusively, for the Division I schools they sought to remediate,
undercutting Title IX's efficacy in creating greater gender equity in
high schools, where there has been little Title
colleges nationwide and1 in
37
IX enforcement to date.

V. HOW TO GENUINELY EXPAND ATHLETIC OPPORTUNITY

A. Suggested Reforms
While gutting Title IX would not expand athletic opportunities for
women or men, wresting control of football and basketball spending
could. One solution is to have the NCAA, in conjunction with university
136. See Samuels, supra note 12.
137. See, e.g., NAT'L WOMEN'S LAW CTR.,
ELEMENTARY

AND

SECONDARY

THE BATTLE FOR GENDER EQUITY IN ATHLETICS IN

SCHOOLS

(May

2002),

available

at

http://www.nwlc.org/pdf/BattleJune 2002.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2003); MINORITY REPORT,
supra note 33, at 10 (Finding 19); id. atl2 (Recommendation 7) (describing how the Office of
Civil Rights has not exercised its authority, as it should, to collect data on gender equity in high
school sports). The Commission failed to specifically address Title IX compliance at the high
school level. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 28 ("Although there has been some
discussion about issues related to Title IX compliance at the high school level, the small amount
of such testimony and the expertise of the Commissioners does not allow for extensive findings
on how high schools are complying with Title IX."). However, Title IX protections are equally
important at the high school level. Amy Hetzner, Review of Title IX May Put Ball in High
Schools'Courts,MILWAUKEE. J. SENTINEL, Feb. 10, 2003, at IA; Kerry A. White, 25 YearsAfter
Title IX Sexual Bias in K-12 Sports Still Sidelines Girls, EDUC. WEEK, June 18, 1997,
http://www.edweek.org/civ/ev-printstory.cfm?slug=38titlei.hl 6 (last visited Sept. 22, 2003) (on
file with MARGINS: Maryland's Law Journal on Race, Religion, Gender and Class).
In the absence of federal enforcement, some states have enacted Title IX equivalencies to
enforce gender equity in high schools. See Florida Educational Equity Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §
1000.05 (West 2003) (requiring high schools to provide equal opportunities, funding and
resources to male and female athletes); Georgia Equity in Sports Act, GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-315
(2001); HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 302A-461-67 (Michie 2001); see also Mike Fish & David A.
Milliron, Florida'sFairer Clime, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 15, 1999, at IH; Mike Fish &
David A. Milliron, Georgia Treats GirlAthletes Second Class, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 12,
1999, at IA.
United States Senator Olympia Snowe introduced a bill during the last session of Congress to
require collection of gender equity data at the high school level. See High School Sports
Information Collection Act of 2003, S. 282, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited Dec. 1, 2003). The Bill was referred to the Senate Committee
on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions where it languished.
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administrations, impose policies to curb the arms race. 138 Secretary
Paige's Commission made two general recommendations regarding
collegiate sports finance.' 39 Recommendation 8 of the Commission's
Report states: "The Department of Education should encourage
educational institutions and national athletic governance organizations to
address the issue of reducing excessive expenditures in intercollegiate
athletics. Possible areas to explore might include an antitrust exemption
for college athletics."' 140 Recommendation 13 advises the Department of
Education to encourage the NCAA "to review its scholarship and other
guidelines to determine if they adequately promote or hinder athletic
participation opportunities." 141 Further, to be more specific, roster limits
for football could reduce the cost of fielding a team. By shrinking the
average size football team of 105 players to 75, new. athletic slots and
athletic scholarships would become open for men142
who want to play other
sports without increasing the gender imbalance.
The NCAA could impose a host of other measures to curb
commercialization, such as limiting game schedules, eliminating
televised tournaments and bowl games, prohibiting product
endorsements, 143 capping coaches' salaries (although this would require
an exemption from anti-trust law), 144 requiring game schedules to

accommodate academic schedules, and limiting practice and training
138. Since its inception, the NCAA has adopted several measures to curb the excesses of
men's football and basketball. In 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt convened college
presidents at the White House to ban the "flying wedge" formation from college football because
it had resulted in 24 deaths in 1904 alone. BOK, supra note 33, at 36. In 1906, the NCAA was
founded in order to develop uniform rules to guide college sports. Id. For the last ten years the
NCAA has required that the university control athletic department product endorsement contracts.
The NCAA limits to eighty-five the number of scholarship players on a football roster. While
imposing these and other incremental limits, the NCAA has proven adept at preventing any
meaningful curbs on college sports commercialization. See, e.g., COLLEGE SPORTS INC., supra
note 34, at 333-340 (describing the NCAA's defeat of a proposal by the American Council of
Education in the early 1980s, which would have given a "President's Board" veto and
modification authority over NCAA rules, enabling university president's to gain more of their
college sports programs).
139.

COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 35.

140. Id.
141. Id. at 36-37.
142. There are only eleven players on the field at any one time and the NFL limits rosters to
forty-five players for game days, so a squad of seventy-five would allow ample substitutions.
143. The University of Michigan Athletic Department copyrighted the "block M" and profits
handsomely from commercial products marketed on the University's reputation. DUDERSTADT,
supra note 17, at 92. WVU has copyrighted its logo as well, but the proceeds go to the university,
not the athletic department. Parsons Interview, supra note 55.
144. Law v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that an
NCAA rule limiting entry level basketball coaches' salaries was an unlawful restraint on trade in
violation of Sherman Antitrust Act).
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regimes to reasonable hours, allowing students to be students. It would
also be advisable to require all scholarships to be administered by the
admissions office and applied on a need basis, thereby eliminating the
employer/employee 1relationship
between college athletic departments
45
and student athletes.

Some of these ideas were bandied about for years, but the special
interests of the decision makers prevented reform. The NCAA is
unwilling to adopt any of these measures,' 46 in large part because it has a
huge financial interest in the commercial college sports entertainment
industry it has fostered. 47 In addition, the NCAA is essentially a trade
organization for Division I coaches and athletic directors 148 and will not
act against their interests. Indeed, as is discussed supra, the Commission
failed to examine the adverse effects of the arms race on minor men's
sports and gender equality, or to consider any of these reforms, because
its membership was heavily dominated by representatives of Division I
schools invested in perpetuating the status quo.
B. Sell Off the Teams
The solution is clear: remove the professional farm leagues from
the universities 149 and sell the teams as franchises along with the
stadiums and training facilities. There could still be college teams for the
true student athletes -just like there are for ice hockey and baseball - but
145. Allen
Sack,
Pay for
Play, NCAA
NEWS,
Mar.
31,
2003,
http://www.ncaa/org/news/2003/20030331/editorial/4007n38.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2003) (on
file with MARGINS: Maryland's Law Journal on Race, Religion, Gender and Class).
146. BOK, supra note 33, at 39-41.
147. BEER AND CIRCUS, supra note 52, at 37 (detailing some of the lucrative financial
incentives that the NCAA receives through the hungry commercial college sports entertainment
industry).
By the mid-1980's, the NCAA received $32 million a year from CBS-TV to
televise the [men's basketball] tournament.., and a few million from ESPN,
still doing every game not carried by CBS .... [I]n 1999, they renegotiated
again, upping the fee [to the NCAA] to almost $6 billion for all tournament
games through 2013.
Id.
The NCAA also cams millions in ticket sales to the March Madness (NCAA men's
basketball) playoffs, having moved them to big astrodome facilities. Id. Throughout the 1990's,
only 25% of this revenue went back to the participants and their conferences. Id. Some of the
losers from the first round failed to even cover their expenses in travel to the tournament. Id. The
remainder stayed in the NCAA coffers. Id.
148. Id. at 34 ("[A]s President Atchley and other critics of the NCAA have argued, the
NCAA functions mainly as a trade association for coaches and athletic directors, implementing
their wishes regardless of these are in the best interests of the member schools .... ").
149. See George Vecsey, Vanderbilt Should ConsiderGetting Out of This Cottage Industry,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2003, at D4.
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they would be organized on a reasonable scale, with schedules and
training regimes compatible with academic life. The athletes who want
to go straight to professional sports life could become professionals and
receive compensation. This would prevent the recurrent scandals 50 that
emerge from the charade that student athletes are really bona fide
students who are not entitled to nor receive remuneration. 15' Those
athletes who remain at the universities would have a chance to be true
student athletes, with schedules that permit them to attend classes and
study. By removing the professional athletes from college athletic
programs, athletic slots would be made available for more students to
participate.
The millions, or perhaps billions, of dollars obtained by the
universities from selling their football and basketball teams, stadiums and
training facilities could be used to endow the remaining university
athletic programs. Serious reckoning would be in order at schools with
failing commercial football and basketball enterprises for which the
market would not pay millions. In the face of a wave of spinoffs at other
schools and in the context of deep university budget slashing, schools
would no longer be able to justify pumping millions of dollars annually
into failing commercial sports enterprises. Much like the emperor's new
clothes, the lack of net revenue from revenue producing sports would
become quite embarassingly obvious.
Initially, the above proposal might sound unrealistic, but it is not.
We have models from the nationwide trend of universities separating
themselves from their medical facilities in a variety of ways, which began
in the mid 1980,s. 152 As is true of the big athletic programs,'

53

hospitals

150. See e.g., Harvey Araton, Men Give Women An Unseemly Model, N.Y. TIMES, April 7,
2003, at D4; Viv Bernstein, Baylor Coach Told Team to Lie to Investigators,N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
17, 2003, Sports Section, at 2; Mike Freeman, Pursuitof Victories Presses on Colleges, N.Y.
TIMES, July 13, 2003, Sports Section, at 4; Mike Freeman, When Values Collide: Clarett Got
Unusual Help in Class, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2003, Sports Section, at 1.
151. COLLEGE SPORTS INC., supra note 34, at 202 (proposing that the academic community
would not complain as much about college sports if athletic directors simply employed paid
athletes instead of "pseudo students"); Vecsey, supra note 149 ("[Ohio State football star
Maurice] Clarett [is] caught up in a web of questionable money and dubious ethics and his own
resentment at working in exchange for an education that he obviously does not want. In other
words, your basic Division I program.").
152. See generallyTHE COMMONWEALTH FUND TASK FORCE ON ACADEMIC HEALTH CTRS.,
ENVISIONING THE FUTURE OF ACADEMIC HEALTH CENTERS 1 (Feb. 2003) [hereinafter
REPORT],
TASK
FORCE
COMMONWEALTH
http://www.cmwf.org/programs/taskforc/ahc-envisioningfuture_600.pdf (last visited Dec. 1,
2003) (on file with MARGINS: Maryland's Law Journal on Race, Religion, Gender and Class).
153. SHULMAN & BOWEN, supra note 33, at 248 ("Sudden changes in volatile revenues
streams can make balancing a budget quite a feat, even for schools with winning teams. The
pendulum can swing quickly.").
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and medical complexes have huge fluctuations in earnings from year to
year. 54 Moreover, for public universities, there are large costs associated
with running medical businesses through state university
bureaucracies.1 55 As academic health centers sought to shield themselves
from the vicissitudes of fluctuating revenues, they partnered with private
partners and sold their hospitals to separate nonprofit and for profit
corporations. 156
WVU again provides an informative case study. WVU sold its
hospital complex, but retained its medical school and dentistry school,
with its staff of faculty and student population. 157 Now, when faculty
members provide patient care, they do so through a physician association
and not the university. 58 The hospital nonprofit corporation, not the
university, pays for all nurses, orderlies, capital improvements, facilities
maintenance and malpractice insurance.' 59 The new hospital entity
16
continues to use the WVU name, through a branding contract. 0
Other schools have chosen to follow different models. Tulane
Medical School, George Washington University Medical School and
Creighton University each sold their hospitals to for profit chains in order
to free themselves from debt, ensure the economic viability of their
clinical facilities and protect themselves from potentially catastrophic
losses. 16 1 These examples, coupled with the case study of WVU,
demonstrate how the separation of the hospital from the university
encourages better business planning in the hospital, removes the drain on
university resources, and seeks to disentangle the academic mission from
the distortions of commercial enterprise.
154. Changes in Medicaid reimbursement rates, competition from HMO's and other market
pressures, as well as fluctuations in level of government funding for education and research
combine to make academic health center revenue streams unpredictable. See COMMONWEALTH
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 152, at 3; ALLEN DOBSON ET AV., FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF

ACADEMIC HEALTH CENTER HOSPITALS, 1994-2002, at 19 (Sept. 2002), available at
http://www.cmwf.org/programs/dobson financialperformance 543.pdf(last visited Dec. 1, 2003).

155.

Interview with Professor Kevin Outterson, WVU College of Law, in Morgantown, W.

Va. (May 5, 2003) [hereinafter Outterson Interview].
156. Id.; David Blumenthal & Joel S. Weissman, Selling Teaching Hospitals to InvestorOwned Hospital Chains: Three Case Studies, HEALTH AFFAIRS, March/April 2000, at 158.
157. Outterson Interview, supra note 155.

158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.

161. Blumenthal & Weissman, supra note 156, at 163.
In the case of Creighton, the hospital trustees concluded that health care had become a
business in which they had neither the managerial capacity nor the capital to compete.... [T]hey
received a capital infusion that could be used to support academic purposes and relief from the
burden of managing a complex business.
1d. at 164.
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While the medical models will need to be substantially revised to
fit athletics, they suggest a path for athletic team spinoffs. Care will need
to be taken to ensure that football and men's basketball are not removed
from the books only as a means of avoiding Title IX accountability.
Players on the new professional farm teams should be accorded no
special consideration if they apply and enroll as part-time students with
Moreover, universities have accommodated the
full-time jobs.
commercial sports enterprises in deep ways.' To reclaim the integrity
of the academic enterprise, selling off the farm teams will need to be
accompanied by a far reaching reevaluation of curriculum, admissions,
promotion, retention and undergraduate student social life.
Although the medical center spinoff models will not apply
entirely to athletics, it makes sense to sell off football and men's
basketball, just as it made sense for universities to separate themselves
from their hospital behemoths. Such a move can be economically,
culturally and academically beneficial to the university.163 It can also
solve the problem of the elimination of men's non-revenue producing
teams that is caused by the football and basketball arms race, but which
has been mistakenly blamed on Title IX. Ultimately, freedom from
commercial sports domination will enable universities to move forward
toward gender equity in athletics and elsewhere.

VI. CONCLUSION

Secretary Paige's Commission spent a year studying the impact of
Title IX on access to athletics for men and women and came to focus on
the elimination of minor men's sports as a major problem in collegiate
162. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text; discussion supraPart III; see also Karen
Arenson, Study ofElite Colleges FindsAthletes Are Isolatedfrom Classmates,N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
15, 2003, at A12 (discussing study by Mellon Foundation concluded that athletes in the Ivy

League and 25 other highly selective colleges are admitted with significantly lower grades and
College Board scores, performed more poorly than would be expected for students with those

grades and test scores, and were increasingly isolated from the rest of the campus community).
163. Two former university presidents have written eloquently about the difficulty of
overcoming vested interests and reclaiming academic values by eliminating the
commercialization of big-time sports. BOK, supra note 33, at 51-53 (describing how university

president's hands have been tied regarding reforming big-time college athletic programs);
DUDERSTADT, supra note 17, at 304 ("[M]ost presidents ... seem resigned to the status quo.").

This well-documented problem has led to a number of suggestions for reform. DUDERSTADT,
supra note 17, at 263-318. I do not mean to imply that this can happen easily or without struggle.

But once the economics of big-time sports and their impact on the culture and integrity of their
host schools are more generally understood, I cannot believe that major change will not occur.
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life. While extolling the virtues of Title IX, 64 the Commission
recommended that Title IX's enforcement mechanisms be weakened in
an attempt to reduce the pressure to cut men's teams. Title IX has
weaknesses that must be addressed, 165 however the elimination of minor
men's teams is not one of those weaknesses. The pressure to cut minor
men's teams is not dictated by Title IX, but by the economics of Division
I-A football and, to a lesser extent, men's basketball.
As long as football and men's basketball teams are allowed to
pursue winning through spiraling expenses, they will dictate athletic
department priorities and distort the academic values of their host
universities. Since the teams effectively operate as unpaid farm teams,
they should be sold to the professionals, shed the charade that they are
collegiate amateur teams, and begin operating openly, efficiently and
more effectively as the businesses that they are. Universities will then be
free to integrate athletic programs back into student life, regain the
integrity of their academic programs and foster gender equality in an
environment of increasing opportunities for men as well as women.

164.
165.

COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 10, at 2.
While female sports participation has increased dramatically during the thirty years

since Title IX was enacted, participation rates still lag behind that of males. "[A]lthough women
in Division I colleges are 53% of the student body, they receive only 41% of the opportunities to

play sports, 36% of over athletic operating budgets, and 32% of the dollars spent to recruit new
athletes." MINORITY REPORT, supra note 33, at 2 (citing NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N,
1999-2000 NCAA GENDER EQUITY REPORT 20, http://www.ncaa.org/library/research.html (last
visited Oct. 27, 2003) (on file with MARGINS: Maryland's Law Journal on Race, Religion,

Gender and Class). The contact sports exemption is also a major impediment to gender equality.
See discussion supra note 29.

